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BOivrPENSIERO

[L. A. No. 23513.

v. SuPERIOR CouRT

In Bank.

r44 c.2(l

J\Iar. 18, 1955.]

FRANK BOMPENSIERO, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al., Ilespondents.
[1] Judges-Disqualification-Bias and Prejudice: Proceedings.Remarks by trial judge while presiding over separate trial
of some persons named in indictment for having participated
in acceptance of bribes by public official in connection with
granting liquor licenses, that Board of Equalization should
"revoke the licenses of those that were ralled before a body,
under oath, and refused to testify on the ground that whatever
testimony they might gi\·e would tend to ine1·iminate them,"
did not show sufficient basis for disqualificatilln of judge in
another trial on ground of personal bias and prc>judiee against
defendant who had refused to testify in the prior trial, and
judge was not in error in striking such statement, where it
was made in criminal prosecution in which defendant was
only indirectly im·olved as a witness aml without indieation
that he was being singled out.
[2] Id.-Disqualification-Proceedings.-~A statl'lllPnt of disqualification which is not verified as prescrilwd by § 170, Code Civ.
Proc., is formally defeetive and is properly ~trieken out by
the trial judge.
[3] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside: Prohibition-Criminal Proceedings.-Probable cause is shown if man
of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and
conscientiously entertain strong suspicion of accused's guilt,
and indictment will not be set aside or prosecution thereon
prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming possibility that offense has been committed and accused is guilty
of it.
[4a, 4b] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Review of Action of Grand
Jury.-Grand jury was justified in believing that each of transactions in which bribe was accepted on behalf of district liquor
control administrator was part of single general conspiracy
to invoke bribe for each new liquor license issued throughout
district, and that petitioner was part of such conspiracy,
where similarity of manner in which contact was made with
restaurant owners seeking licPnses and bribery accomplished

[3] See Cal.Jur., Grand .Jury, § 15.
McK. Dig. References: 111 .TudgP~. ~~ -tn, ;)(); I:~] ,Judge~, ~ 5():
[:!] IndietmPJJt :md Information, ~SS(7): Prohibition, ~-tl; Ill
Onmd .Jury, ~ :ll : I;") J ('ouspiraey, ~ Ll-; r()] Cons pi I'H(',V, ~~ 13, Hl;
[7] Couspinl<',\', ~lH; [H] Brilwr.v, ~B.il; [!lj Crimiwll Law,~;););
[10] Criminal Law,~ HH; Bribery,~ 1il.;i.
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tewled
to :magest ('OJHmon plan of purtiripation, where
district administrator's discussion with employee in his office
eonel'lrning advisability of having petitioner "talk to" certain
applicant for li<:<'IJSP suggested some reason to suppose he would
agre.e to do so, and where petitioner's statement to such applicant in regard to issuance of general license after a year implied knowledge of nwnner in which district administrator and
his associates generally operated.
[5] Conspiracy-Indictment.--Direct proof of formal understanding between parties to conspiracy is not required as basis of
indictment or information.
[6] !d.-Statute of Limitations: Evidence.---Proof that one of
overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy occurred after time
before which statute of limitations would be a bar is sufficient, and evidence of acts occurring before that time may be
received to show conspiracy.
[7] !d.-Indictment and Information-Proof and Variance.Though there is no direct evidence to connect accused with
offense charged in indictment that he and others asked and
agreed to receive a bribe, where general conspiracy reasonably
may be supposed to have existed prosecution may proceed on
theory that criminal offense in furtherance of conspiracy is
charged.
[8] Bribery-Statute of Limitations.-Renmnably construed, Pen.
Code, § 800, prescribing six-year limitation for indictment for
acceptance of bribe by public official or public employee,
refers to those statutes (see Pen. Code, §~ 68, 86, 93, 165)
under which a public official who "asks, receives, or agrees to
receive a bribe" may be punished, there being no proviSIOn
which expressly makes punishable acceptance of bribe by
public official or public employee.
[9] Criminal Law-Principals and Accessories.-Reasonably construed, Pen. Code, § 971, abrogating distinction between accessory before fact and principal and between principals,
Pxpres~es legislative intent to abolish distinctions made at
common law as to various types of participants in commission
of crime and to make all of them subject to same procedural
and substantive limitations.
[10] !d.-Statutes of Limitation: Bribery-Statutes of Limitation.
-Pen. Code, § 800, placing in one category any felony other
th;cm murder, embezzh•JtJent of public money and acceptance of
bribe by public official or public employee, and in another
[ 5) See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspirary, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conspiracy,
§ 29 et seq.
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur. Criminal Law, § 72.
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category
of a bribe, does not
of
limitation based on identity of
among types of criminal acts, and person who aids and abets
public official to receive a bribe is
to statute of limitations though not a public officer.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of San Diego County and John A.
Judge
thereof, from trying petitioner on an indictment. \Vrit denied.
Augustine, Bryans, Hagen & 0 'Connor and J:i'rank Desimone
for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, \Villiam E. James,
Deputy Attorney General, James Don Keller, District Attorney (San Diego), Barton C. Sheela,
and Jack R. I_jevitt,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondents.
EDlVIO~DS, J.-By this proceeding in prohibition, Frank
Bompensiero challenges the jurisdiction of the superior court
to try him upon an indictment which names him as one of
several persons who participated in the acceptance of bribes
by a public officiaL He questions the sufficiency of the
indictment to charge, and of the evidence before the grand
jury to establish, the alleged crimes. He also attacks the trial
judge's action in striking from the record a statement disputing the qualification of the judge to rule upon preliminary
motions.
According to the evidence before the grand jury, Charles E.
Berry was District Liquor Control Administrator of San
Diego and Imperial Counties. It was the practice of the
Board of Equalization to rely upon the recommendation of
the district administrator as to the issuance of a new on-sale
liquor license. Berry was the sole official in the district
c'mpowered to make such a recommendation.
Several owners of cafes or restaurants in the district testified that they paid substantial sums of money in excess of
the statutory fee to obtain a new license. In a typical transaction the owner, having made unsuccessful application to
the office of the district administrator, would contact a third
party intermediary who assertedly could arrange to have the
licens<' issued. Upon payment to that person of several thousand dollars, the owner was instructed to renew his application with the assurance that a license would be forthcoming.
After a new application, the license issued through normal
channels.
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~wrre

named in the indictment with Bomacter1 as intermediary between Berry and
the restaurant ow1wrs. However, in only one transaction is
linked with the granting of a license.
Tlle cvidcnc(' in that regard is as follows:
fn the winter
Gillenberg approached Provart,
an
in the district administrator's office, and discussed
the
of
a seasonal on-sale license. .After
two Ol' tlmce of sueh conversations, Provart spoke to Berry
about the nmtter.
agreed that Gillenberg could qualify
for a
but ProYart was instructed to tell him it would
cost $5,000 to have it issued. A counterproposal of $3,500
was made to Proyart and conveyed to Berry. They discussed
1he adyisabilit.y of having Bompensiero "talk to" Gillenberg,
and Provart was told to tell Gillenberg that "Frank will come
and see him."
A man who identified himsrlf as "Frank B." called upon
Gilll'nberg anr1 told him he could get a license but it would
eost
~When Gillrnberg expressed doubt, he was told
to ask Proyart if "I•'rank B. is all right and if I know what
I am talking abont." Proyart assured him that Frank B.
could be drpended upon.
A short time later, Gillenberg made application for a
seasonal li0cnse. Two or three weeks passed without action
upon it. He then rrceiYed a telephone call instructing him
to meet Frank B. in the lobby of a designated hotel and to
have tbe money with him. There he met the man prrviously
identified t.o him as I~rank B., and they discussed payment.
A cashier's cheeh: for $5,000 at :first was refused, but aftrr
further conwrsntion ihe check, which when presented to the
grand jnry bore the indorsement ''Frank Bompensiero, '' was
aceepted. 'l'lH' Jieens~' was issued in April, 1951, and soon
afterwards, Brrry gave Provart $400 as his share of the
"Gillen berg deal."
Gillenberg Jwrl been told by Bompensiero that after a year
from the time the seasonal license would be issued, he
eonlcl rrapply and n•crive a general license. Such an appli('ation vms mar1e b~· Gillenberg in October, 1952. After about
1hrPe ~weeks in which no action upon the application was
taken, a man identifying himself as Bennett called upon
(lillenlwrg. Bennrtt told him he eould obtain a general licrnse
only aft,,r pa;vnwnt of $2,500. Gillenberg agreed and paid
ilw amount to Bennett in cash. A few days later he reapplied
for the general license, and it was issued.
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The indictment was returned on September 1, 1934. In
Count I, Bompensiero and several other persons are accused
of ''Conspiracy to Commit the Crime of Asking and Receiving Bribes by a Public Officer'' in that they ''within 3 years
last past . . did agree to ask and receive bribes on behalf
of Charles Berry.'' Eight overt acts in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy are asserted, including Bompcnsiero 's instruction to Gillenberg, on F'ebrnary 27, 1951, to apply for a
seasonal license and Bennett's demand for $2,500 for a general license made on October 25, 1952.
In Count X, it is alleged that Bompensiero and others on
April 3, 1951, "did ask and agree to receive" a bribe from
Gillenberg upon an understanding that the votr, opinion or
action of Berry upon matters officially before him wonld be
influenced. A similar charge is made in Count XI, in which
it is asserted that Bompensiero and others "did ask and agree
to receive a bribe" from Gillenberg on October 25, 1952.
The indictment also included several other charges against
Bompensiero.
\Vhen arraigned, Bompensiero moved to quash the indictment and filed a written demurrer to it. All of the counts
against him were dismissed except Counts I, X and XI, with
regard to which his motion was denied and the demurrer
owrruled. He then filed an "Affidavit and Application for
Removal of 'l'rial Judge.'' The eonrt ordered the document
stricken on the ground that it was frivolous and sham.
As grounds for issuing the writ of prohibition Bompensiero
eontencls that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
striking the ''statement and affidavit'' from the reeord. He
also argues that the evideuee before the grand jury is insuffieient to establish probable eause for believing him guilty
of the offenses eharged in Counts I and XI. Count X, he
asserts, on its faee shows thr bar of the statute of limitations.
[1] 'rhe ground of asserted disqualifieation of the trial
judge is "personal bias and prej udiee" against Bompensiero.
allegedly demonstrated by two statements made by him while
presiding over a separate trial of some of the persons named
in the indietment. In that proeeeding, Bompensiero was
calle(l as a witnrss fot· the proseeution and rdu::;ed to answer
on the ground that his testimony might tend to ineriminate
him. Sevpral other wi1ttess<>s were ealled and dainH•d the
sanw privilege. During arguments upon a motion for a new
trial, the trial jndge remarhd that he had "believed the
witnesses for the prosrention" and expressed the opinion that
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"if the Board of Equalization wants to do their duty, I think
what they should do, instead of pieking on these fellows that
came in here, they should also revoke the licenses of those
that were called before a body, under oath, and refused to
testify on the ground that whatever testimony they might
give would tend to incriminate them.'' Bompensiero asserts
that he holds a liquor license and thus is in the category
mentioned in the latter statement.
These remarks, made in a criminal prosecution in which
Bompensiero was only indirectly involved and without indication that he was being singled out, show so little basis for
claiming personal bias or prejudice against Bompensiero as
to justify the conclusion that the charge of disqualification
is sham and frivolous. In that circumstance, the trial judge
was not in error in striking the statement and affidavit. (Of.
People v. Darby, 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 439 [250 P.2d 743] ;
People v. McOullottgh, 100 Cal.App.2d 101, 111 [223 P.2d
37] .) [2] There is also another basis for the order. Section
170 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, in a court
of record, a statement of disqualification of the trial judge
''shall be verifit>d by oath in the manner prescribed by section
446 of this code for the verification of pleadings.'' Bompensiero 's statement was not verified and, upon that ground, is
formally defective and was properly stricken out. (Of. People
v. Kirk, 98 Cal.App.2d 687, 693 [220 P.2d 976].)
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the indictment, Bompensiero urges that Count I charges only
a single, general conspiracy to ask for or receive bribes on
behalf of Berry. As he views the evidence before the grand
jury, it does not show that he conspired with any of the
other persons accused of being intermediaries for Berry, but
connects him only with Berry aud Provart. The count may
not reasonably be construed as charging a series of isolated
conspiracies, he argues, but even if it may be so read, the
only one which includes him terminated more than three years
before the indictment was returned and is barred by section
800 of the Penal Code.
[3] Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution
or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (People
v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344] .) An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the
possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused

lS

:Jil [2Hi
:::ct :n H, :122 1121 P .::ld

[4a] The evidence before tho
a elose
question as to "Whether it :oho\YS
was a part
conspiracy existed and that
of it. 'l'he
of manner in which contaet was made
"With the restaurant owners and the
tends strongly to
a common
of
although that evidence alone probably "Would not show Born's connection with it.
's discussion
with Provart conceming the advisability of
Bompensicro ''talk to'' Gillen berg suggests some reason to suppose
he >Yould agree to do so, possibly beeansc llc llad acted in a
similar capaeity previously. Bompensiero 's statement to
Gillrmberg in regard to the issuanee of a general license
after a year implies knowledge of the manner in whieh Berry
and his 1:ssociates generally operated. Also, in each case the
bribe given for a general lil;eJJsc was either
,000 or $7,500;
i he requirement that Gillen berg pay an additional $2,500 for
the general liel:nse aftr·r paying $5,000 for the seasonal one,
>Yas eousi:;tcnt with this pattern.
[5] The rnle governing the sufficiency of the evidence to
justify a snspicion of a conspiracy has been summarized as
f ollmn:: "Direct proof of' a formal understanding between
pa1·ties to the co1:spiracy is not required as the basis of an
indictment or information. '[I]t 'vas not necessary for the
State io rn·oye that the parties actually came together, mui ually discussed their common design, and after reaching a
formal agreement set out upon their previously agreed course
(J[ condnct.
'I'he extent of the assent of minds which are
iuvolved in a conspiraey may be, and from tlw secrecy of
the rrime usually must be, inferred by the jury from the
proofs of the facts and circumstances which, when taken togethPr, apparently indicate that they are parts to the same
c~ompkte whole.' ''
(Lorenson v. Super£or Court, sttpra, 35
Cal.2c1 57-58.) [ 4b] The grand jury was justified in the
belief that each of the transactions in which a bribe was
aceepierl was part of a single general eonspii·acy to invoke
a bribe for each new liquor license issued throughout the
distritt.
[6] In this situation, tlJe prosecution of the crime charged
in Connt I is not barred. Proof that one of the overt acts
in furthPranec of the eonspiracy occurred after the time
before whid1 tlw statute of limitations would be a bar is
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sufficient, and evidence of acts occurring before that time
may be received to show the conspiracy. (People v. Gordon,
71 Cal.App.2d fi06, 629 (163 P.2d 110] .) Here, several overt
acts are alleged to have occurred within three years prior
to the date the indictment was returned.
[7] Bompensiero correctly contends that there is no direct
evidence which connects him with the offense charged in
Count XI.
since a general conspiracy reasonably
may be supposed to have existed, prosecution under this count
may proceed upon the theory that a criminal offense in furtherance of the conspiracy is charged.
Bompensiero argues that under section 800 of the Penal
Code,~· the applicable period of limitation for the offense
charged in Count X is three years. He points out that it is
there alleged that the offense was committed on or about
April 3, 1951, more than three years preceding the return
of the indictment. The position of the attorney general is
that the six-year period specified for "the acceptance of a
bribe by a public official or a public employee" is applicable.
[8] Count X does not charge that he accepted a bribe,
but only that he "did ask and agree to receive" a bribe.
However, the offense charged in that count is in the language
of section 68 of the Penal Code, which in turn is similar in
wording to other provisions which prescribe punishment for
a public official who ''asks, receives, or agrees to receive'' a
bribe. ( Cf. Pen. Code, §§ 86, 93, 165.) There is no provision
which expressly makes punishable "the acceptance of a bribe
by a public official or a public employee." Reasonably construed, section 800 refers to those statutes under which a
public official who ''asks, receives, or agrees to receive a
bribe'' may be punished.
Another argument is that Bompensiero is not a ''public
official or a public employee," and is charged only with aiding
and abetting a public official to receive a bribe. Construed
strictly in his favor, he asserts, section 800 may not be read
as prescribing the six-year period for one, not a public official,
who merely participates in the receipt of a bribe.
*An indictment for any other felony than murder, the embezzlement
of public money, the acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a
public employee, or tlJt, falsification of public records, must be found,
and information filed, or case certified to the superior court, within three
years after its commission. An indictment for the acceptance of a bribe
by a pnblic official or a public employee, a felony, must be found, and
tl1e informntion filed, or case certified to the superior court, within six
years after its commission.''

18G

BmrPExsn:no 1'.

SrPEIUOR

Cm:nT

[HC.2(1

In jurisdictions '' lwre
commission of a erimina1 act is made
the statnte
of limitations ll'hieh coni-rols
for tbe eriE1iual act
is held not to apply to ihr oirense of
am1 abetting.
The general statntc of limitations applicable 1u "other offenses" is hel(1 to eontrol.
8/!t/c, (Tex.Crim.
App.) H7 S.\Y.2d 111, 112: State
71 IU. 151
[ 43 A.2c1 54, 58, HiO A.T,.R
. ) But in thn Patriarea casP
it \Yas speeifirally stated that a clif!'rreut rnle might apply
when the I_jegislatnre has remoye(l the distindion between
nne who eommits a e1·imc and one who aic!s in its eommission.
'l'he comt said that it "must follmv the common law, a;.; long
as our legislature does not abrogate it and deelare aeeessorics
before the faet to be principals." (P. 58.) And in 8tate v.
Baehmeycr, 247 Wis. 294 [19 X\Y.2d 261], it wa;;, held that
the statltte of limitation applieahk to the substantive offense
applies to one who participates as a principal.
[9] Section 971 of the P('llal Co(1e nroYicles in part .
''The distinction bt't\H'eu an aecessory before the fac·t and a
principal, and between principals in tbe first and sceond
degree, in cases of a fdony, is abrogated; am! all persons
concerned in the (~ommission of a felony, whether the~· directly
commit the act constituting the offense, m· ai(1 and abet in
its commission, though not prest•nt, shall hereafter be proseentecl, tried, and punished as principals . . . . '' (Emphasis
added.) Reasonably eoustrued, this seetion expresses a legislative intent to abolish the distinctions made at eommon law
as to the Yariotls typc~s of participants in thn cmnmission of
a erime and to mal\c all of t}J,m subjeet to the same proeeclural
and substantive limitations.
[10] Seetion 800 of tlw p,~ual Code pro\·ides 110 exeeption
to this rult'. Contrary to BompensiPro 's posH ion, it cloes not
specify a period of limitation based npon the identity of
the offender, but differentiates among the types of criminal
acts. It plaees in one category "any other felony than
munler, the embezzlement of public money, the acceptance of
a bribe by a public official or a publie employee, or the falsification of public records." (Emphasis added.) It places in
another category tllf' ''acceptance of a bribe.'' Because
Bompensiero may lw proseeuied, trie(l and punisht'd as prin('ipal for the eriminal 11d of "
of a bribe by a
nubli(; offieial," Cou11t X of tl11' itH1ietmunt iR not barred by
I im it at ion.
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The
discharged.
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk,
Spence, ,J., concurred.

denied and the alternative writ
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Count I charges Bompensiero and several other persons
with a general conspiracy to commit the crime of asking
and receiving bribes by a public officer. Count X charges
that Bompensiero and others on April 3, 1951, did ask and
agree to receive a bribe. Count XI alleges that Bompensiero
and others on October
1952, did ask and agree to receive
a bribe.
I do not believe that there was evidence sufficient to support
a reasonable belief that Bompensiero was involved in a general
conspiracy as alleged in Count I, nor that there was any
evidence or inference connecting Bompensiero with the crime
alleged in Count XI.
To show that there was sufficient evidence against petitioner
the majority opinion states : ''The similarity of manner in
which contact was made with the restaurant owners and the
bribery accomplished tends strongly to suggest a common plan
of participation, although that evidence alone probably would
·not show Bornpcnsiero's connection with it.
However,
Berry's discussion with Provart concerning the advisability
of having Bompensiero 'talk to' Gillen berg suggests some
reason to suppose he would agree to do so, possibly because
he had acted in a similar capacity previously. Bompensiero 's
statement to Gillenberg in regard to the issuance of a general
license after a year implies knowledge of the manner in which
Berry and his associates generally opc,rated. Also, in each
case the bribe given for a general license was either $7,000
or $7,500; the requirement that Gillenberg pay an additional
$2,500 for the general license after paying $5,000 for the
seasonal one, was consistent with this pattern." (Emphasis
added.)
In other words, it is held that the similarity of the plan
of operation of bribery is "probably" not enough to show
petitioner's connection with it, then that connection is purportedly shown by reliance on such similarity. The majority
points to only two other bits of evidence to fortify the similarity in evidence, namely: (1) That Berry's discussion
with Provart about having petitioner talk to Gillenberg,

188
tbe pt:rson who was to pay the brilw money, indieates petitioner would talk to Gillenberg, and
(;iOJJer's statement
to Gillcnberg that application should bc made for a general
license by Gillenberg after a year. Those two items of evidence arc not sufflcient, either separately,
or in
conjunction •vith the admittedly weak
of contacting the bribers. It seems unreasonable to say that
because Berry and Provart, his assistant, diseusscd the possibility of haviug petitioner speak to Gillenberg about the
bribe, a conspiracy is proven either between
and petitioner or among petitioner and the other persons working
for Berry. 'rhat a person (Berry) will talk to another person
(petitioner) about committing a crime (bribery) may indicate
that the former thinks the latter will be receptive to the
proposition but it does not show that the latter would in fact
be receptive to it or would conspire with him or with other
persons in carrying out Berry's orders. If it did it would
mean that if one person thinks that another wonld commit
a crime, then there is evidence that the other would agree
to commit it. It is not only no proof of the conspiracy but
it docs not even raise a reasonable suspicion.
Petitioner's statement to Gillenberg that the latter should
apply for a general license after operating for one year
under the seasonal license does not indicate ''knowledge of
the manner in which Berry and his associates generally operated." None of the other evidence in this case makes any
reference to seasonal licenses. There is not the slightest
intimation in the record that it was the general yJract,ice of
Berry and the other defendants to arrange for the issuance
of a seasonal license, followed in one year by the issuance
of a general license. Indeed, this very fact-that Gillenberg
was to get a seasonal license only-is an indication of dissim1:larity between the acts in which Bompensiero participated
and any other acts of bribery to obtain a license. It is evidence
tending logically to a belief that there was no general conspiraey involving petitioner. Gillenberg testified, " . . . this
Frank B. told me that I would get a general license after
operating a year. . . . He said that I would automatically
get a general license and for me to go in and apply after
I had operated a year which I did, you sec, and, of course,
I found that out not to be true after I went in to get the
license." (Emphasis added.) The logical inferences which
could arise from such events would be: (1) 'rhat :B'rank B.
thought that the population of Jacumba, the location of
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Gillenberg's establishment, would be such in one year that
Gillenberg, could qualify for a general license; or (2)
that Frank B. believed that it was the practice of the
Board of Equalization to issue a general license after one
year's operation under a seasonal license; or (3) that Frank
B. believed that the $5,000 payment would satisfy Berry,
and that the general license would be issued without the
necrssity of further bribery, i.e., that Frank B. was in woeful
ignorance of '' th0 manner in which Berry and his associates
genera1ly operated.''
The fact that an additional bribe of $2,500 was obtained
before the general license was issued to Gillenberg, bringing
the total bribe to $7,500, again lacks any logical reference to
petitioner. Not one word of evidence was offered which
directly or by inference connected petitioner with this later
act of bribery. In one transaction Gillenberg paid $5,000 to
obtain a seasonal license. Later, desiring a general license,
he paid an additional $2,500. The ''going rate'' of bribery
for a general license was $7,500. These facts illustrate nothing
more than the time-worn and probably dubious maxim that
there is ''Honor even among thieves.'' They indicate that
Berry did not want to charge Gillenberg more than the going
rate for a general license, for fear that Gillenberg would
complain of the overcharge in too loud a voice. Again, I
feel that it should be emphasized that no evidence was offered
which in any way connected petitioner with the $2,500 bribe
in October, 1952.
Even if it is assumed that there was sufficient evidence to
show that petitioner conspired with Berry, there is no evidence which even remotely connects petitioner with the other
JWrsons working for Berry, and thus there is no evidence
fihowing a general conspiracy. It is conceded by the majority
that to constitute a general conspiracy, there must have been
an agreement not just among Berry, petitioner and Gillenberg,
but also among petitioner and the other per·sons working for
Berry. It appears that Berry, being in a position to give
or refuse licenses had various persons whom he used to solicit
bribes from parties desiring licenses. There is no evidence
indicating any connection among those persons other than
that they oerasionally worked for the same person, Berry.
'l'he only reasonable inference is that there iR no agreement
amow~· those persons, since Berry, for his own protection,
would keep his various henchmen in ignorance of his operations as between each other.
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It seems clear to me, therefore, that the Grand Jury of
San Diego County did not have before them suffic:ient evidence
to justify a reasonable belief that petitioner was guilty of
the crimes alleged in Counts I and XI of the indictment.
The major point remaining for discussion is vvhether thr
prosecution of Bompensiero for the offense charged in Count
X is barred by the statute of limitations (Pen. Code, § 800).
The majority opinion points ont two specific facts by reason
of which it should have held, but did not, that snch prosecution is barred by the statute of limitation: (J) "Count X
does not charge that he [Bompensicro] accepted a bribe'';
(2) " . . . Bompensiero is not a 'public official or a public
t>mployee.' " Penal Code, section 800, imposes a three-year
limitation on the bringing of an indictment for any other
felony than murder, the embez::dement of public money, the
acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a p7tblic employee,
or the falsification of public records. A six-year limitation
is imposed on the bringing of an indictment for the acceptance
of a bribe by a p1tblic official or a public ernployee.

In its decision on the two points enumerated above, the
majority has employed a process of reasoning from one
statute to another to arrive in the end at what it describes
as a reasonable construction of Penal Code, section 800. I do
not quarrel with the "reasonableness" of its construction.
The point which I desire to emphasize is that this is not the
only possible construction of the statute; and, as this court
has repeatedly held in tbe past, "\Vhcn language which is
reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal
law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to
the offender will he adopted. In other words, criminal statutes
will not be built up 'by judicial grafting upon legislation . . . .
[I] t is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question
of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.' " (People v. Ralph,
24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P .2d 401] ; People v. Valentine, 28
Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1, 167 A.L.R. 675]; In re lJJcVickers,
29 Ca1.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40]; In re Bramble, 31 Cal.2d
43, 51 [187 P.2d 411]; People v. Chessman, :38 Cal.2d 166,
182 [238 P.2d 1001] ; Ex prwte Hoscnhcim, 83 Cal. 388, 391
123 P. 3721; People v. 8ayr·e, 26 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 7fi7, 761
[70 P.2d 546].)
rl'lHo question here ]Jr<>sented is one of first impression in
this state. Only one r.ase (State v. Bachrneyer, 247 \Vis. 294
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!19 N.\\T.2d 2fH, 26:31) is cited which reaches the same) result
as the majority
\V e are not bound by
that case, decided
to the law of a sister state. I feel
that we arc bound by the long established, eminently just
policy set out in the eases decided in our own state, by this
very court.
'l'he writ of prohibition sought by petitioner should be
granted.
Petitioner's applic~ation for a rehearing was denied April
13, 1955. Carter, ,J., \vas of the opinion that the application
shoulcl be grant("d.
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HAY A. GARDNER et al., Hespondents, v. BASICH
BROTHERS CONS'l'RUOTION COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[la, lb] Automobile Stages-Rules and Rate Regulations.-Rules
and rate regulations prescribed by Public Utilities Commission for contract highway carriers become part of every contract between highway contract carrier and shipper, and
parties are dt)emed to have contracted with such provisions
in mind.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Actions-Limitations.--Where agreement by licensed
highway carriers with highway construction contractors to
haul certain materials by dump truck was entered into by
parties themselves and was in parol, applicable statute of
limitations in carriers' action to recover undercharges ( difference between what was paid at hourly rate and larger
amount allegedly due at ton-mileage rate) is two-year period
governing action on oral contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 339,
subd. 1) rather than three-year period for action ou liability
created by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 1).
[3] Limitation of Actions-Liability Created by Statute.-A liability created by statute, within purview of three-year statute
of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, sub d. 1), is one in which
[1] See Am.Jur., Motor Transportation, §~ 17, 39.
[3] See Oal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, ~ 76 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Limitation of Actions, § 48.
McK.~Dig. References: [1] Automobile Stages, § 1.1; [2, 4, 5]
Automobile Stages, § 16; [3] Limitation of Actions, § 45.

